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Following Suit with the Second Circuit
DEFINING GAMBLING IN THE ILLEGAL GAMBLING
BUSINESS ACT
INTRODUCTION
The federal government’s involvement in the regulation
of gambling has been a demonstration of the principles of
federalism. For the most part, the federal government has
recognized that gambling is an area of law left to the prerogatives
of the states.1 Absent the influence of federal law, state
gambling law has developed to be extremely varied, not just
from state to state, but from game to game within a state.2
Much of that variety is due to differing definitions of gambling,
and how large a role chance, as opposed to skill, takes in
gambling. The federal government has regulated gambling but
it has not inserted itself into substantively defining gambling.
Rather, the federal government has intervened when states
have inadequately enforced their own laws.3 The overarching
federal policy on gambling is to aid the states in enforcing what
they define as gambling, rather than the federal government
determining its own definition of gambling.4 This note argues
that the Illegal Gambling Business Act (IGBA) should be read
in light of this federal policy.
The IGBA prohibits “conduct[ing], financ[ing], manag[ing],
supervis[ing], direct[ing], or own[ing] all or part of an illegal
gambling business.”5 The statute then continues to define what
constitutes an illegal gambling business in § 1955(b)(1), which
enumerates three elements:
1 G. Robert Blakey & Harold A. Kurland, The Development of the Federal
Law of Gambling, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 923, 925 (1978) (citing COMM’N ON THE REVIEW
OF THENAT’L POL’Y TOWARD GAMBLING, GAMBLING IN AMERICA 1, 5 (1976)).
2 See infra Part I.
3 See Blakey & Kurland, supra note 1, at 926; 116 CONG. REC. 591 (1970)
(statement of Sen. McClellan).
4 Blakey & Kurland, supra note 1, at 925; S. REP. No. 91-617, at 74 (1969);
see also infra Parts II–III.
5 18 U.S.C. § 1955(a) (2012).
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(1) “illegal gambling business” means a gambling business which—
(i) is a violation of the law of a State or political subdivision in which
it is conducted;
(ii) involves five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage,
supervise, direct, or own all or part of such business; and
(iii) has been or remains in substantially continuous operation for a
period in excess of thirty days or has a gross revenue of $2,000 in
any single day.6
A recent decision by the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of New York, United States v. Dicristina, rejected
the argument that the definition of an illegal gambling business
is limited to the elements listed in § 1955(b)(1).7 The court in
Dicristina held that § 1955(b)(2) added a fourth element to the
crime. Section 1955(b)(2), which reads, reads “‘gambling’
includes but is not limited to pool-selling, bookmaking,
maintaining slot machines, roulette wheels or dice tables, and
conducting lotteries, policy, bolita or numbers games, or selling
chances therein,” added a fourth element to the crime.8 The
court interpreted § 1955(b)(2) as requiring the government to
prove that in the type of game played (in this case Texas Hold
’Em), chance predominated over skill.9 In other words, in
addition to the type of game violating state law, the game also
had to fulfill the federal definition of gambling gleaned from
§ 1955(b)(2), that chance predominates skill, in order to prove a
violation of § 1955. The court’s extensive statutory
interpretation analysis found the plain language and
legislative history to be inconclusive regarding the meaning of
§ 1955(b)(2) and held that, due to the rule of lenity, the
defendant’s narrower interpretation must prevail.10 The court
dismissed the indictment, holding that skill predominated over
chance in Texas Hold ’Em.11
The Second Circuit overruled the district court’s reading
that § 1955(b)(2) constitutes a fourth element and held that to
be guilty of operating a gambling business in violation of federal
6 Id. § 1955(b).
7 United States v. Dicristina, 886 F. Supp. 2d 164, 235 (E.D.N.Y. 2012), rev’d
726 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2013).
8 Id. at 224-25, 231; 18 U.S.C. § 1955(b)(2).
9 Dicristina, 886 F. Supp. 2d at 231. This is in addition to proving that the
game violates state law, which may adopt a test other than the predominance test.
10 Id. at 235. “[T]he rule of lenity requires that ambiguous criminal laws be
interpreted in favor of the defendants subjected to them.” Id. at 200 (internal
citations omitted).
11 Id.
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law, the prosecution only has to prove the three elements
articulated in § 1955(b)(1).12 The Second Circuit relied on the
plain meaning of the statute, reading § 1955(b)(2)’s phrase
“including but not limited to” as introducing a non-exhaustive
list of the types of gambling businesses that violated § 1955,
and not as substantively defining gambling.13 The court also
reasoned that this reading of the plain language of the statute
was bolstered by the legislative history, which was concerned
with reaching gambling businesses of a certain size and
character, rather than with prohibiting certain types of
games.14 The Second Circuit held that the rule of lenity did not
apply because the meaning of the statute was unambiguous.15
It reversed the judgment of acquittal and remanded for a
reinstatement of the jury verdict.16
United States v. Dicristina is the first case where a court
analyzed § 1955(b)(2) in depth. Following the district court
decision in Dicristina, the District Court of Guam declined to
interpret § 1955(b)(2) as containing a fourth element of the
crime for many of the same reasons enunciated in the Second
Circuit’s opinion.17 Prior to Dicristina, other courts hearing
cases regarding a prosecution under § 1955 assumed, with
little or no analysis, that the definition of an “illegal gambling
business” consisted of only those elements listed in § 1955(b)(1).18
This note argues that the elements listed in § 1955(b)(1) are the
complete definition of “illegal gambling business,” and whether a
certain type of game constitutes gambling under that statute
should be determined solely by state law. Courts should follow
suit with the Second Circuit’s reading of § 1955(b)(2), which is
12 United States v. Dicristina, 726 F.3d 92, 102 (2d Cir. 2013).
13 Id. at 98-100. The court distinguished between the use of “including but
not limited to” and of “means,” which is used elsewhere in the statute to define terms.
It also pointed out that § 1955(e)’s language defining games of chance could have been
used in § 1955(b)(2) if Congress so desired, and that there is no evidence § 1955(e) was
intended to modify § 1955(b)(2). Id.
14 Id. at 102-04.
15 Id. at 104-05.
16 Id. at 106.
17 See United States v. Hsieh, No. 11-00082, 2013 WL 1499520, at *4 (D.
Guam, Apr. 12, 2013).
18 See, e.g., United States v. Atiyeh, 402 F.3d 354, 372 (3d Cir. 2005). Unlike
the cases that follow, this case did address the argument made in Dicristina. The Third
Circuit found that a violation of § 1955 included conducting a gambling business as
defined by the three elements in § 1955(b)(1), as distinguished from the definition of
gambling provided in § 1955(b)(2). The court’s discussion, however, did not extend
beyond this distinction, and the argument was not analyzed in depth. Other cases
include United States v. Gotti, 459 F.3d 296, 340 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Truesdale,
152 F.3d 443, 446 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Cyprian, 23 F.3d 1189, 1199 n.14 (7th
Cir. 1994); United States v. Sacco, 491 F.2d 995, 998 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc).
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consistent with the history of federal involvement in gambling.
The historical practice of the federal government has been to
defer to state law definitions of gambling, and the IGBA should
be read in accordance with that practice.
Part I illustrates the variety among state law definitions
of gambling through a case study of the popular poker game
variant Texas Hold ’Em. Demonstrating that variety in Part I
supports the arguments in Parts II and III, that Congress
recognized and intended to defer to the states’ varying definitions
of gambling. The background of the varying definitions of
gambling also explain why the IGBA’s legislative history, which is
devoid of any mention of the definition of gambling, should not be
read to adopt one of those definitions. Part II explores the role
of the federal government in gambling throughout American
history, and argues that the federal government only legislates
when the states cannot adequately implement their own
gambling policies, and only seeks to prohibit gambling which is
illegal as defined by state, not federal, law. Part III analyzes
the legislative history of the IGBA, which was a part of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, and argues that the
IGBA continued the federal tradition of aiding the states’
gambling enforcement only where the states cannot enforce their
own law. It should not be read as indicating the federal
government’s concern about which types of games are prohibited
in a distinct federal definition of gambling. This part analyzes the
language of § 1955 with the aim of showing that the statute
deferred to state definitions of gambling without adding a new
element in § 1955(b)(2).
I. THE VARIANCE IN STATE LAWDEFINITIONS OF
GAMBLING, ASDEMONSTRATED BY THE POKERGAME
VARIANT TEXASHOLD ’EM
Poker has a long and storied history in America. It first
appeared in the United States in the early nineteenth century
in the port of New Orleans.19 The game then quickly spread by
19 Poker is believed to have been brought by the French settled in New
Orleans, and derived from a French card game called poque. It is believed that poker
also derives from the card games Bouilotte, Poch (also known as Pochen or Pochspeil),
As-Nas, and Brag. The name ‘poker’ is most likely derived from non-French speaking
Americans mispronouncing Poque. See Anthony Cabot & Robert Hannum, Poker:
Public Policy, Law, Mathematics, and the Future of an American Tradition, 22 T. M.
COOLEY L. REV. 443, 447-50 (2005); David Parlett, A History of Poker, PAGAT (Dec. 23,
2010), http://www.pagat.com/poker/history.html.
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way of riverboats travelling the Mississippi River.20 Poker
flourished in the western frontier states, especially in Texas.21 By
the end of the nineteenth century, poker’s popularity had
increased to the point where one reporter questioned whether it
had supplanted baseball as “the national game.”22 By that time it
was no longer “confined to the rough South-west”23 and was even
played among senators.24 Poker continues to grow in popularity
today, attracting more players with the accessibility of online
poker. In addition, poker has become a spectator event that
reaches wider audiences than ever with the advent of the
televised broadcasting of major poker tournaments.25
Despite the consistent popularity of the game,
commercialized poker today remains illegal in the majority of
states.26 Of the states that do not ban poker in all forms, the law
20 Cabot & Hannum, supra note 19, at 448. For a colorful account of the
widespread cheating that occurred on Mississippi riverboats, see DES WILSON, GHOSTS
AT THE TABLE: RIVERBOAT GAMBLERS, TEXAS ROUNDERS, INTERNET GAMERS, AND THE
LIVING LEGENDSWHOMADE POKERWHAT IT IS TODAY 57-67 (2008).
21 WILSON, supra note 20, at 25-56, 71-119 (giving accounts of some of the
stories and characters associated with poker in the West and in Texas).
22 The National Game, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1875, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9B02EED6173DE43BBC4A52D
FB466838E669FDE. It should be noted that the article’s author does acknowledge that
people may disagree with this point, believing that people are uninformed about poker.
Id. The article argues, however, that the proliferation of literature about the rules of
poker shows otherwise, and that “those of us who yet remain in ignorance of the
subject . . . are in danger of being classed as old fogies.” Id.
23 Id.
24 Poker Players Among Senators, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1884, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9C02E7DA1238E033A25750C2A9659C
94659FD7CF (“Nearly all the Southern Senators enjoy a sit-down [poker game]
occasionally for just enough stakes to make the play interesting.”).
25 The World Series of Poker is broadcast on ESPN, the World Poker Tour on
the Travel Channel, and the Poker Superstar series on FSN, to name a few. Richard
Sandomir, Poker’s Popularity Doesn’t Appear Ready to Fold, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/12/sports/othersports/12sandomir.html?_rmoc.semity
n.www=&sq=world%20series%20of%20poker&st=nyt&scp=4&pagewanted=print.
26 This is as opposed to social poker. Thirty-nine states have not legalized
commercial casinos, but this figure does not include states where there are casinos on
tribal lands, nor states where poker itself (but not commercial casinos) is legal, with
certain restrictions. JOHN LYMAN MASON & MICHAEL NELSON, GOVERNING GAMBLING
46 (2001). For example, in its constitution, California prohibits commercial casinos but
allows the Governor to conclude compacts with Indian tribes authorizing them to run
casinos on tribal lands. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 19. While California does not permit
casinos on non-tribal land, it does allow local governments to license cardrooms, within
certain limitations. I. Nelson Rose,When Is Poker Legal?, GAMBLING AND THE LAW (2005),
http://www.gamblingandthelaw.com/index.php/columns/108-when-is-poker-legal.html.
Also note that now the 39 state figure needs updating, as New Yorkers have recently
voted to amend their state constitution to allow casinos outside of New York City. Glenn
Blain, New York Voters Approve 7 Las Vegas-Style Casinos, DAILY NEWS (Nov. 6, 2013
12:33 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/election/n-y-voters-approve-7-las-vegas-
style-casinos-article-1.1508030.
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varies widely. Some states, such as Montana27 and Florida,28
allow poker but keep it under stringent restrictions. In California,
poker is legal under state law, leaving local governments to
determine whether to license cardrooms.29 In the more well-
known legalized gambling cities, such as Las Vegas and Atlantic
City, the states have taken different approaches. Poker is legal
throughout the state of Nevada, while New Jersey has confined
the game’s legality to Atlantic City.30 Six states, mostly those on
the Mississippi River, have legalized riverboat casinos.31 Many
states, for example Kentucky and New Hampshire, allow poker
games to run for the benefit of charities and nonprofit
organizations, subject to certain regulations.32 Despite these
exceptions, the game of poker is prohibited by most states. There
are arguments, though, that under the various common law tests
of those states, poker could be legal.33
27 See Montana Card Games Act of 1974, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 23-5-306 to
23-5-332. (West 2013). Poker is an authorized card game, id. at § 311, but is subject to
restrictions contained in the rest of the Act, such as the permits needed to conduct
games id. at § 306, licenses required for poker dealers, id. at § 308, a restriction on the
hours of play, id. at § 307, a limit of $300 on prize money, id. at § 312, and special rules
covering tournaments, id. at § 317.
28 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 849.085 (West 2013), which allows penny-ante
games of poker held in a person’s dwelling in which the winnings do not exceed $10 per
hand. Section 849.086 allows the licensing of cardrooms subject to restrictions as set by
that statute and by The Division of Pari-mutuel Wagering of the Department of Business
and Professional Regulation. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 849.06.
29 Rose, supra note 26. California has an interesting history with poker; “stud-
horse poker” was made illegal by statute in 1885, but that language was repealed from the
statute in 1991, in part because no one knew what “stud-horse poker” was. Bennett M.
Liebman, Poker Flops Under New York Law, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 1, 22-28 (2006–2007). Those games that are not specifically prohibited by state
statute, as no form of poker currently is, can be prohibited or regulated by localities
without being in conflict with or preempted by state law. Id.
30 MASON & NELSON, supra note 26, at 32-33. Nevada is the only state to
have legalized commercial casinos throughout the entire state. Id. Other states that
have followed New Jersey’s lead in limiting legalized commercial casinos to specified
geographic areas include Michigan in Detroit, Colorado in three cities, and South
Dakota in Deadwood. Id. at 39. Deadwood is a tourist attraction for those wishing to
see where Wild Bill Hickok was allegedly shot while holding what came to be known as the
“dead man’s hand,” two pair, aces, and eights. SeeWILSON, supra note 20, at 3-23 (2008).
31 These six states are Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Mississippi, Louisiana, and
Missouri. Indiana has water-based casinos on the Ohio River and Lake Michigan, while
the other five states have riverboat casinos on the Mississippi River. MASON&NELSON,
supra note 26, at 36-9; Ronald J. Rychlak, The Introduction of Casino Gambling: Public
Policy and the Law, 64 MISS. L. J. 291, 304 n.77 (1994–1995). For an in-depth
discussion of Mississippi riverboat casinos, see Rychlak at 305-11.
32 Rose, supra note 26.
33 The different common law tests focus on the main issue of whether a game
is one of skill or chance. Many argue that poker is a game of skill and therefore under
some of the common law tests, is legal. Both the different types of common law tests, and
the issue of whether poker is a game of skill or of chance, will be discussed later in this note.
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A. The Legal Significance of Skill in State Law
There is great statutory and common law variance among
the states regarding the regulation of poker and other forms of
gambling. States have differing regulatory schemes for gambling,
and they employ different common law tests to determine whether
games are a legal one of skill or an illegal game of chance. Because
the state law is so varied, it makes sense that in the IGBA,
Congress intended to defer to state law definitions of gambling, and
not supplement them with a new, federal definition of gambling.
Whether games such as poker are categorized as a game
of skill or one of chance has legal significance in determining
whether the game is legal under state law. The Supreme Court
has defined a lottery as having three elements: consideration,
distribution of a prize, and distribution of that prize according
to chance.34 Although the Supreme Court was addressing the
elements of a “lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme,”35
these three elements also constitute the common law definition
of gambling in general.36 The consideration element requires
that something of value, such as money or property, be given
up for a chance to win a prize.37 The expenditure of time and
effort can fulfill the consideration requirement, but the amount
of time and effort that must be expended varies among
jurisdictions.38 The prize element requires the chance that
participants win something of value.39 The prize does not have
to be monetary and it does not have to have a value greater
than that of the consideration given.40 The last element,
chance, is defined differently in different jurisdictions.
The distinction between games of skill and games of
chance was recognized long ago. Historically, governments
have justified permitting games of skill to encourage their
34 Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Am. Broad. Co., 347 U.S. 284, 290 (1954).
35 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
36 I. NELSON ROSE, GAMBLING AND THE LAW 77 (1986); J. Royce Fichtner,
Carnival Games: Walking the Line Between Illegal Gambling and Amusement, 60
DRAKE L. REV. 41, 45 (2011–2012) (“While there was once a practical difference
between the use of the terms ‘gambling’ and ‘lotteries,’ any line of demarcation between
the two terms has disappeared. . . . If all three elements—consideration, prize, and
chance—are present, the activity constitutes gambling.”).
37 Fichtner, supra note 36, at 46.
38 Id. at 46-47; ROSE, supra note 36, at 77-79. For example, the Supreme
Court in Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Am. Broad. Co. held that the consideration of
expending effort by listening to the radio station in order for a chance to win the prize
was insufficient to fulfill the element of consideration. 347 U.S. at 294.
39 Fichtner, supra note 36, at 47.
40 Id.
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citizens to develop and perfect skills that were considered of
merit.41 There are games that are seen as pure skill, such as
chess (even though there is an element of chance in deciding
who moves first), and those on the other end of the spectrum
that are considered games of pure chance, such as bingo.42
There are a large number of games that fall in the middle of
the spectrum somewhere between skill and chance, and it is in
this gray area where courts employ different legal tests to
determine whether the game is prohibited by law.
When there is a game of mixed skill and chance, one test a
state court might employ is what has come to be known as the
“pure chance” test.43 The pure chance test considers whether the
participants in the game can influence the outcome of that game
by their skill.44 If they can, then the game is one of skill and is
legal.45 Under this approach, it is immaterial to what extent skill
has influenced the outcome, so long as it played a part in
determining it.46 Modern American courts have largely rejected
the pure chance test.47 A few states have even adopted a rule,
called the “any chance” test, which is the opposite of the pure
chance test. Under the any chance test, if the outcome is
determined in any measure by chance, it is considered gambling.48
The majority of American courts determine whether a
game is one of skill or chance using the predominance test,
alternatively known as the dominant factor test.49 This test
considers whether skill or chance predominates in the game in
question.50 The test focuses on the influence of skill on the
outcome of the game, not whether it is “just one part of the
41 Id. at 48-49 (quoting Corp. Org. & Audit Co. v. Hodges, 47 App. D.C. 460,
466 (D.C. Cir. 1918)); Anthony N. Cabot, Glenn J. Light & Karl F. Rutledge, Alex
Rodriguez, A Monkey, and the Game of Scrabble: The Hazard of Using Illogic to Define
the Legality of Games of Mixed Skill and Chance, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 383, 389 (2008–
2009) For example, ancient Roman societies encouraged martial games among young
men to practice the skills they would use as future soldiers, and Islamic law’s
prohibition on gambling did not extend to wagers on horse racing because training
horses was useful for war.
42 Fichtner, supra note 36, at 49.
43 Id. (citing Secretary of State v. St. Augustine Church, 766 S.W.2d 49
(Tenn. 1989)).
44 Liebman, supra note 29, at 8.
45 Id.
46 Fichtner, supra note 36, at 49.
47 Id. at 50.
48 Anthony N. Cabot & Louis V. Csoka, Fantasy Sports: One Form of
Mainstream Wagering in the United States, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1195, 1205 (2007).
49 Cabot, Light & Rutledge, supra note 41, at 390.
50 Id. at 390-92.
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larger scheme.”51 Some of the factors courts may consider as
evidence that the game is one of skill include whether: a
skillful player would, in the long-term, win more often than an
unskillful player; skill can be learned from experience and/or
from acquiring more knowledge by reading; knowledge of
mathematics is useful in the game; knowledge of psychology in
games played against other competitors can help influence the
actions of others; player participation influences the outcome of
the game.52 Some courts also consider the pool of participants,
analyzing whether the people who are likely to participate in the
game actually possess the skill to influence the outcome of the
game, rather than whether a small class of experts would be able
to do so.53
In applying the predominance test, courts have differed
over whether poker is a game of skill or chance.54 Courts in
Illinois,55 Nebraska,56 North Carolina,57 Massachusetts,58 and
Utah59 have held that poker is a game of chance.60 In contrast,
51 Morrow v. State, 511 P.2d 127, 129 (Alaska 1973) (citing Commonwealth v.
Plissner, 4 N.E.2d 241 (Mass. 1936)).
52 ROSE, supra note 36, at 80-81.
53 See Fichtner, supra note 36, at 51-53, & n.73 (listing cases).
54 Cabot & Hannum, supra note 19, at 459. In some jurisdictions, the
question of whether a game is one of skill or one of chance is treated as a question of
fact for the fact finder, while in other jurisdictions it is a question of law for the judge.
Compare People v. Mitchell, 444 N.E.2d 1153, 1155 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (upholding
jury’s finding that games of poker are not “bona fide contests for the determination of
skill”), with Bell Gardens Bicycle Club v. Dep’t of Justice, Cal. Rptr. 2d 730, 750-51
(Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (treating jackpot poker as a game of chance).
55 Mitchell, 444 N.E.2d at 1153, 1155 (upholding jury’s finding that games of
poker are not “bona fide contests for the determination of skill”).
56 Indoor Recreation Enters., Inc. v. Douglas, 235 N.W.2d 398, 400-02 (Neb.
1975) (holding, using a predominance test, that both poker and bridge are games of
chance). After Indoor Recreation, the Nebraska legislature changed the language of the
applicable statute. Am. Amusements Co. v. Neb. Dept. of Revenue, 807 N.W.2d 492,
500-01 (Neb. 2011). However, the Supreme Court of Nebraska has held that the new
language simply “rewords the predominance standard,” rather than change the test.
Id. at 500-02. Because the test has not been changed, it seems that Indoor Recreation
remains good law.
57 State v. McHone, 90 S.E.2d 539, 540 (N.C. 1955) (upholding jury conviction of
defendant who allowed a game of chance, poker, to be played and wagered on his property).
58 Chapin v. Haley, 133 Mass. 127 (1882) (upholding jury verdict convicting
defendant, when the jury was charged that one of the elements required for a guilty
verdict was a finding that draw poker was a game of chance). But see Commonwealth v.
Club Caravan, Inc., 571 N.E.2d 405, 406 (Mass. App. 1991) (holding that, as a matter of
law, video poker machines involved an element of skill, although not as much skill as
live poker, that made the machines legal under the statute).
59 Collet v. Beutler, 76 P. 707 (Utah 1904) (refusing to recognize a debt because
it was a gambling debt borrowed to play poker, a game of chance. The court wrote that
the trial court should have directed the criminal law be enforced against these parties.).
60 Cabot & Hannum, supra note 19, at 462; Liebman, supra note 29, at 19-21.
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courts in California,61 Oregon,62 and Washington63 have held
that poker is a game of skill. Some states retain a distinction
between games prohibited as a lottery (a game of chance) and
those prohibited as gambling; therefore, some games could be
considered not a lottery (and therefore a legal game of skill),
but still prohibited or otherwise regulated as gambling.64
A minority of states employ a test similar to the
predominance test, though more stringent, known as the
material element test.65 Under this test, if chance is a material
element (meaning it is more than incidental) in determining
the outcome of the game, that game is considered gambling,
even if skill predominates.66 Eight states—Alabama, Alaska,
Hawaii, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, and
Oregon—adopt the material element test.67 Applying this test,
New York courts have held that poker is a game of chance.68
A few states have their own unique approaches to
determining whether a game is one of skill or of chance. Ohio
statutorily defines poker, as well as craps and roulette (but not
bingo), as a game of chance.69 Texas prohibits playing for
money in “any game played with cards” regardless of whether
the game is one of skill or chance.70 In Texas there are a few
available defenses to a charged violation, including one that
requires the defendant to prove that the “gambling [was] in a
private place,” that no one “received any economic benefit other
than personal winnings” and that “except for the advantage of
61 Bell Gardens Bicycle v. Dep’t of Justice, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 730, 750-51 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1995) (1995) (holding that jackpot poker is a game of chance where skill does
not play the same role as it does in regular draw poker). Recall that California has a
unique situation, in which certain enumerated games are prohibited by state statute
(of which stud-horse used to be, but is no longer one), and other gambling games
(including poker) may be prohibited or regulated as a locality so chooses without being
in conflict with the state law. See Liebman, supra note 29, at 23-27.
62 State v. Coats, 74 P.2d 1102, 1106 (Or. 1938) (stating, albeit in dicta, that poker is
not a lottery because it is a game of skill, even though it is prohibited as a gambling game).
63 State ex rel. Schillberg v. Barnett, 488 P.2d 255, 257-58 (Wash. 1971) (en
banc) (holding that poker is not a game of chance for the purposes of a prohibited
lottery, but that poker is a gambling game prohibited in the state’s criminal law).
Though the definitions of lottery and gambling in many jurisdictions are the same,
some jurisdictions have retained the distinction.
64 See, e.g., Coats, 74 P.2d at 1106; Barnett, 488 P.2d at 257-58.
65 Cabot, Light & Rutledge, supra note 41, at 392-93.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 392, n.64.
68 See People v. Turner, 629 N.Y.S.2d 661, 662 (Crim. Ct. 1995) (explaining
New York’s material element test); United States v. Dicristina, 886 F. Supp. 2d 164,
169 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (listing New York cases that have held poker is a game of chance),
rev’d, 726 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2013).
69 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.01(D) (West 2013).
70 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 47.02(a)(3) (West 2013).
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skill or luck, the risks of losing and the chances of winning
were the same for all participants.”71
For the purposes of this note, the significance of the
different state law tests and their applications is not so much
in their substance, but rather in their variety. Given this
variety, it makes sense that the IGBA defined gambling solely
by reference to state law and did not create an additional,
federal element to supplement these tests in § 1955(b)(2). It is
also significant that even states who employ the same test have
reached different results, even further counseling Congress’
deference to state law. This stance is bolstered by the fact that,
while there are many possible definitions of chance in
gambling, Congress did not debate any of these definitions
when discussing the IGBA.72
B. The History and Rules of Texas Hold ’Em
There are many different types of poker, but none are
more popular today than Texas Hold ’Em.73 That popularity is
due in large part to the fact that No Limit Texas Hold ’Em is
the main event in the World Series of Poker. The World Series
of Poker started in 1970 in Benny Binion’s Horseshoe Casino as
a chance for some of the biggest names in poker to play each
other in a high-stakes game.74 Since then, the event has grown
into a spectacle with thousands of competitors, 61 different
tournaments, and a $1 million dollar buy-in for the 2012 main
event.75 In the 21st century, the advent of online poker further
increased the accessibility and popularity of Texas Hold ’Em to
amateurs, and poker tours featuring Texas Hold ’Em continue
to attract players and viewers alike.76 The increasing
popularity of poker has led organizations, such as the Poker
71 Id.§ 47.02(b).
72 See infra Parts III.B–C.
73 Liebman, supra note 29, at 5 (citing JOHN SCARNE, SCARNE’S GUIDE TO
MODERN POKER 14 (1980)).
74 WILSON, supra note 20, at 175-76. This game grew out of one held the year
before, called the “Texas Gamblers Reunion,” which included the same cast of
characters. Id. Tom Moore had suggested to Binion that they make it an annual game
to crown a world champion. Id. The first champion, Johnny Moss, was elected by a vote
of the players in 1970. Id.
75 World Series of Poker, A Numbers Game – 2012 WSOP Main Event, available
at http://www.wsop.com/2012/BY-THE-NUMBERS-2012-WSOP-MAIN-EVENT.pdf (last
visited Jan. 27, 2014).; World Series of Poker, Fact Sheet – The Big One for the One Drop,
available at http://www.wsop.com/2012/thebigone/files/BIGONE_FACTSHEET.pdf (last
visited Jan. 27, 2014).
76 Liz Benston, TV Fans Go All-In on Poker, LAS VEGAS SUN (June 25, 2006,
7:50 AM), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2006/jun/25/tv-fans-go-all-in-on-poker/.
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Players Alliance, to advocate for the legalization of poker. The
Poker Players Alliance is a nonprofit organization that lobbies
Congress and state legislatures for laws favorable to poker and
files amicus briefs in cases regarding poker.77
Texas Hold ’Em is a non-house banked game, meaning
that the dealer does not play and the house does not have a
stake in the outcome.78 Rather, players are competing only for
each other’s money.79 In Texas Hold ’Em, each individual
player is dealt two pocket, or hole, cards. These cards will be
combined with the five community cards, which are shared and
available for all the players to use, in order for the players to
create the best five-card hand possible.
The community cards are revealed in a staggered manner,
which offers players multiple opportunities to make decisions on
how to bet. Before pocket cards are dealt, the player to the left of
the dealer button must bet the small blind, and second to the left
must bet the big blind.80 After the hole cards are dealt, but
before any community cards are dealt, there will be the first
round of betting (pre-flop); betting occurs sequentially in a
clockwise-fashion. At this time, a player has the option on his
or her turn to either call or raise the bet, or to fold the hand.81
When each player has either called or folded, the dealer deals
three cards face up (unless, of course, only one player remains),
known as the flop. This is followed by a second round of
betting, and then the fourth card, known as the turn. And then
there is a third round of betting, followed by the fifth card,
known as the river.
Once all the community cards have been revealed, there
is one final round of betting. If two or more players remain in
the game, there is a showdown and the player with the highest
77 Mission Statement, POKER PLAYERS ALLIANCE, http://theppa.org/about/
mission/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2013). The PPA filed an amicus brief in United States v.
Dicristina. See Memorandum of Law of Amicus Curiae the Poker Players Alliance in
Support of Defendant Lawrence Dicristina’s Motion to Dismiss Superseding
Indictment, United States v. Dicristina, 886 F. Supp. 2d 164 (E.D.N.Y. 2012), rev’d 726
F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2013).
78 The house usually makes its money either by a rake from the pot, typically
5% to 10%, though some may charge an hourly fee or a flat rate per hand. See
Dicristina, 886 F. Supp. 2d at 173 (quoting Cabot & Hannam, supra note 19 at 452-53).
79 Id.
80 The dealer button will rotate clockwise after each hand, thereby rotating
who has the mandatory small and big blinds, as well as the order of betting in the
betting rounds. The big blind is usually double the amount of the small, and is the
minimum bet allowed in the game. Id. at 172; WILSON, supra note 20, at 326.
81 Another way you can play Texas Hold ’Em is to have an ante from all
players in lieu of blinds. In games played under these rules there is the additional
option of checking.
2014] DEFINING GAMBLING 1307
hand wins. Who wins the showdown is determined by the
hierarchy of hands.82 In the event of a tie, the winner is determined
by the kickers, the highest cards in the player’s five-card hand
other than the cards already used to make the significant part of
the hand (the pair, for instance). If there is still a tie after
considering the kickers (for instance, when the players have
the same kickers because the highest cards are the ones on the
board), the players will split the pot. Many hands of poker
never make it to the showdown because all but one player has
already folded. In these cases the winner is not required to
show his or her hand.83
C. The Skill Employed in Texas Hold ’Em
Texas Hold ’Em can be used as an example to illustrate
why states can vary widely in their determinations of whether a
specific game is legal, even if they adopt the same legal standard
regarding the element of chance. Even using the same legal
standard for chance, there are valid arguments supporting both
that poker is a game of skill and one of chance. Some argue that it
is a game of chance because which cards are dealt is a chance
occurrence. Others argue that poker is a game of skill. During a
poker game, players utilize several different skill sets and make
numerous strategic choices: bluffing, opponent modeling,
unpredictability, betting strategies, risk and money management,
psychology, and calculating probabilities of certain cards being
dealt or certain hands being made.84 Because of the numerous
choices being made, and because poker is a game of incomplete
information, it has been used in research for computer science and
artificial intelligence.85
One study shows that 75.7% of the sampled 103 million
hands ended before showdown.86 The same study also found
82 For a more detailed discussion of hand rankings in the context of Texas
Hold ’Em, complete with illustrations, see SAM BRAIDS, THE INTELLIGENT GUIDE TO
TEXASHOLD ’EM 6-10 (2d ed. 2010).
83 Of course those who fold do not show their hands either. For the basic rules
of the game, see Dicristina, 886 F. Supp. 2d at 172-73; WILSON, supra note 20, at 326-
27; or one of the many books on how to play Texas Hold ’Em, such as BRAIDS, supra
note 82, at 5-10.
84 This list is not intended to be all-inclusive. See Dicristina, 886 F. Supp. 2d at
173-76; Cabot & Hannum, supra note 19, at 467-83; Noga Alon, Poker, Chance, and Skill,
5-13 (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.tau.ac.il/~nogaa/PDFS/skill4.pdf.
85 Ivars Peterson, Playing Your Cards Right: Poker Comes Out of the Back
Room and Into the Computer Science Lab, 154 SCI. NEWS 40, 40 (1998).
86 PACO HOPE & SEAN MCCULLOCH, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF TEXAS HOLD
’Em 5 (2009).
1308 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:3
that 50.3% of the hands that did end in a showdown were not
won by the player with the best hand (because the stronger
hand had folded before the showdown).87 The implication of
these statistics is that the games’ final results are not determined
by the cards (the element of chance), but rather the decisions the
players made (the skill).
Poker is a game of incomplete information because
players do not know which cards their opponents hold or which
cards will be dealt in the flop, turn, and river.88 However,
because it is played with a deck of 52 cards, there are a limited
number of possibilities. Therefore, the probabilities of making
each type of hand can be calculated.89 The probabilities of making
these hands change each time more cards are dealt. To use an
example from Anthony Cabot, Esq. and Professor Robert
Hannum, a player has a 1 in 509 chance of making a flush
before any cards are dealt.90 If the player is dealt two spades for
their hole cards, and there are two spades and a diamond on
the flop, the odds against making a flush on the turn card is
approximately 4.2 to 1. If the player does not make the flush
after the turn card is dealt, the odds against him or her making
it on the river is 4.1 to 1. The probability that you will fail to
make the flush on either the turn or the river is 1.86 to 1.91
This kind of analysis can be utilized by skillful players to help
them determine the probability of forming a certain hand for
both themselves and for their opponents (who they might guess
based on the community cards and their betting strategy was
trying to make a certain hand), guiding the other decisions the
player makes during the course of the game.
The probability of poker hands is only one of the factors
that can influence the outcome of a hand. Using opponent
modeling, players can categorize the type of play of their
opponents (for example: their level of skill, whether they are a
passive or aggressive bettor, whether they play a lot or relatively
few hands) and then use that categorization to exploit the
opponents’ weaknesses.92 Players can defend themselves against
opponent modeling by being unpredictable, changing their style of
87 Id.
88 Cabot, Light, & Rutledge, supra note 41, at 396-98l; Peterson, supra
note 85, at 40.
89 For a chart listing the probability of making each type of hand, see Cabot
& Hannum, supra note 19, at 472.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 474.
92 Peterson, supra note 85, at 40.
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play, and making random decisions in order to mislead opponents
into categorizing one’s style of play incorrectly.93
Another skill players may utilize is betting strategy.
Players can use wagers to try to influence another player’s
decision to call, raise, or fold a hand. For instance, players can
make it uneconomical for their opponents to call or raise, or can
give them information (possibly false) about the strength of
their hand.94 An important factor in betting strategy is a
player’s position at the table, which determines the order in
which the bets are placed.95 A player betting later will have
more information about the other players’ hands based on their
opponents’ decisions, which could be combined with other
information, such as knowledge of the opponent’s playing type
and betting habits, to better predict the opponents’ hands.96
One betting strategy commonly employed by skillful
players is bluffing. The basic concept of bluffing is that a player
bets aggressively in order to give opponents the impression
that he or she has a strong hand, when in fact the player does
not, in the hope that this will entice opponents to fold.
However, this form of bluffing can be too predictable when
playing skilled opponents, so experienced poker players may
employ a form of bluffing known as the post oak bluff.97 In this
type of bluff a player bets a small amount, giving opponents the
impression that the player is trying to make them call because
the player has a strong hand. The opponents will think the
player is trying to make them call, and rather than falling into
that trap, the opponents will fold, when in actuality the player
did not have a strong hand.98 This strategy would be most
effective in a situation where the opponent has modeled the
player as one who makes small bets when they have strong
hands. This is an example of how the different skills a player
utilizes interact with one another. The various skills used in
poker support the argument that poker is a game of skill, not a
game of chance.
93 See id.; Alon, supra note 84, at 9-10.
94 United States v. Dicristina, 886 F. Supp. 2d 164, 174-75 (E.D.N.Y. 2012),
rev’d, 726 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2013).
95 Note that the order of betting on any given hand can be considered an
element of chance, although the order of betting does rotate with each hand.
96 However, there are players who prefer to play up front (meaning they
prefer to bet earlier rather than later in the betting order). See Dicristina, 886 F. Supp.
2d at 175; Alon supra note 84, at 11-13.
97 Dicristina, 886 F. Supp. 2d at 174-75.
98 Id.
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Whether poker is a game of skill or chance, and how
that is determined, varies depending on the applicable state
law. State law varies greatly in how it defines the element of
chance in a gambling game. Because state law is so nuanced, it
would make sense that Congress deferred to state law in
§ 1955(b)(1) when it defined an “illegal gambling business” as
one which operated in violation of state law. Further, it does
not seem likely that Congress adopted one of the various
definitions of gambling in § 1955(b)(2) without any discussion
of which definition it was adopting. It also is in keeping with
the history of federal regulation of gambling to defer to the
states for the substantive definition of gambling rather than
adopt a federal definition. With respect to the IGBA, this reading
fits with Congress’s intent because the motivation behind the
legislation was to aid the states where they have failed to enforce
their own anti-gambling law, not for the federal government to
take charge in the efforts to define illegal gambling.99
II. THE FEDERALGOVERNMENT’S ROLE IN REGULATING
GAMBLING
Traditionally, gambling has been an area largely left to
the states to regulate.100 The federal government has only gotten
involved in the regulation of gambling when it had reason to
believe the states alone could not adequately enforce their own
gambling laws.101 Early federal gambling law in the nineteenth
century focused on the governance of lotteries, and not much
else.102 These anti-lottery laws were often early battlegrounds
for shaping the concept of federalism during a time when
expansion of the federal government’s powers was much
99 See infra Part III.
100 See Blakey & Kurland, supra note 1, at 925.
101 Id. at 926.
The earliest congressional concern arose in response to the inability of states
acting alone to control the perceived abuses of the nineteenth century state-
chartered lotteries. Subsequent federal gambling legislation has manifested a
variety of policies that include depriving organized crime of its gambling
revenue, harmonizing federal gambling taxes with diverse state gambling
policies, and developing a coherent gambling policy to govern federal
enclaves.
102 See id. at 927-43 (discussing federal regulation of lotteries in the 19th
century and at the turn of the century); I. Nelson Rose, Gambling and the Law®: The
Third Wave of Legal Gambling, 17 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 361, 370, 374 (2010)
[hereinafter Rose, Third Wave] (discussing the first federal anti-gambling laws,
describing them as weak due to the view of the federal government as not having much
power, and discussing the use of the commerce clause in the late 19th century).
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contested.103 In the early twentieth century, Congress “virtually
abstain[ed]” from regulating gambling, though it did prohibit
broadcasting lottery advertisements in the Federal
Communications Act of 1934.104 Congress also began to regulate
commodities futures, which was then considered a form of
gambling.105 After this hiatus, the federal government once
again began a period of legislative activity starting in 1950
with the Kefauver Committee.106 With this new period of
activity the federal government had a new reason for involving
itself with gambling—the connection between gambling and
organized crime.107 During this time, the federal government
was mindful that the regulation of gambling was still mainly
within the purview of the states, and sought to aid the states in
curbing illegal gambling where organized crime created unique
problems for state and local governments. The federal
government did not seek to substantively define gambling.
Instead, its primary aim was to help the states enforce their
own gambling laws. Because the history of the federal
regulation of gambling is a story about federalism, it is through
this lens that federal legislation concerning gambling,
including the IGBA, should be viewed.
A. Federalism and the Lottery
The first period of federal regulation concerning
gambling focused primarily on lotteries. Lotteries were
widespread in the colonial era and post-Revolutionary war, as
they were an easy way for both governments and private
individuals to raise capital.108 Beginning in the 1820s and
103 See, e.g., Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903); NAT’L INST. OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT & CRIM. JUSTICE, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF
GAMBLING 1776–1976, at 497-99 (1977) (listing constitutional provisions which became
the center of debate in anti-lottery legislation, both in Congress and in the courts);
John Dinan, The State Constitutional Tradition and the Formation of Virtuous
Citizens, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 619, 648 (1999) (“Each of these cases [Cohens v. Virginia and
Champion v. Ames], however, dealt more with the relationship between the federal and
state governments than with the issue of gambling per se.”).
104 Blakey & Kurland, supra note 1, at 946, 958 n.138.
105 Id. at 958 n.138. Congress passed the Future Trading Act in 1921, which
was later declared unconstitutional. Congress then passed the Commodity Exchange
Act in 1936. Id.
106 NAT’L INST. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT & CRIM. JUSTICE, supra note 103, at 562-
63. The Kefauver Committee, led by Senator Kefauver, was formally known as the Senate
Special Committee to Investigate Crime in Interstate Commerce. Id. at 562 n.60.
107 See id. at 562-64.
108 Rose, Third Wave, supra note 102, at 368-70 (describing this period as the
‘first wave’ of legalized gambling); Dinan, supra note 103, at 649.
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1830s, public sentiment had turned against lotteries due to the
exposure of corruption and scandal in lotteries.109 The reaction
was a wave of state legislation and state constitutional
amendments banning lotteries; by 1862, all but two states,
Missouri and Kentucky, had banned them.110 But after the Civil
War, some Southern states legalized lotteries to raise funds to
rebuild.111 Even though many states had banned lotteries
within their borders, they could not keep other states from
selling their residents lottery tickets through the mail, since
regulation of the mail was under federal jurisdiction.112 To solve
this problem, Congress passed legislation in 1868 that
prohibited mailing lottery offers through the U.S. Post Office.113
The law was amended in 1876, and among the alterations was
the deletion of the word “illegal,” which had the effect of
prohibiting the mailing of all lottery-related papers, including
those legal under state laws.114 This provision was controversial
when debated by the Senate, as Senators argued that the
legality of lotteries was the prerogative of the states.115 The law
was upheld as constitutional in Ex parte Jackson, but the
Supreme Court avoided the federalism question by focusing on
the power of the federal government to regulate the U.S. Post
Office rather than the intrusion on states’ power, ignoring the
10th Amendment argument before the Court.116
109 Rose, Third Wave, supra note 102, at 369-70; Dinan, supra note 103, at 649.
110 Rose, Third Wave, supra note 102, at 369-70; For a discussion of the
Supreme Court’s involvement and interpretation of the Contract Clause regarding
these state law prohibitions, see Blakey & Kurland, supra note 1, at 929-31.
111 James J. Devitt, Legal History: The Louisiana Lottery, 55 LA. B.J. 346
(2008). Some of the states that legalized lotteries in the antebellum period included
Louisiana, Kentucky, Alabama, Georgia, and Mississippi. Id. It seems that there was
another wave of anti-lottery sentiment following that period, because “[b]y the end of
the [19th] century, 35 states had prohibitions against lotteries in their constitutions
and no state permitted lotteries again until 1963.” Id.
112 Blakey & Kurland, supra note 1, at 931. When other state chartered
lotteries sold tickets through the mail to residents of states that had banned lotteries,
the anti-lottery states could only enforce their laws by going after the in-state
consumers, since they had no jurisdiction over the other states or the mail system.
Enforcing their laws by going after the purchasers of the lottery tickets proved
“difficult, expensive, and unpopular.” Id.
113 NAT’L INST. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT & CRIM. JUSTICE, supra note 103, at
501-03 (citing Act of July 27, 1868, 15 Stat. 194, codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1302 (2012)). This law was difficult to enforce in practice because the post office could
not open letters due to Fourth Amendment protections, and employees were not
allowed to delay mail. See id. at 503.
114 Blakey & Kurland, supra note 1, at 933.
115 NAT’L INST. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT & CRIM. JUSTICE, supra note 103, at
505-06 n.11.
116 Id. at 506-08.
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Despite the law being upheld, some state-operated
lotteries sold tickets through the postal system in open violation
of the federal law, because enforcement was ineffective.117 Of
these, the biggest problem for states that prohibited lotteries was
the Louisiana Lottery, dubbed the “Serpent.”118 The Louisiana
legislature allegedly accepted bribes in return for authorizing
the lottery and giving it tax exemptions.119 Over 90% of the
lottery’s revenue came from interstate sales.120 Other states
were powerless to stop the sale of these tickets in their own
states, and pressure mounted on Congress to take action.121
President Harrison addressed Congress about the issue and
urged federal legislation to help the states who could not
control the effect another state’s action had on their own
constituents.122 In 1890, Congress responded and amended the
earlier law by broadening the definition of prohibited material,
extending the prohibition to newspapers, and authorizing the
post office to detain letters they suspected solicited lottery
ticket sales.123 This 1890 Act was the product of “fifteen years of
congressional debate” about the role of the federal government
and the protection of states’ rights.124 Opponents of the
legislation argued that it was the states’ prerogative to
legislate on moral issues, and that the federal government
should not be able to undermine that legislation by
criminalizing activities that were legal under state law.125
Proponents countered that states that prohibited lotteries were
unable to protect themselves from the Louisiana Lottery. Those
states needed federal legislation because they did not have the
power to regulate the postal system or interstate commerce, and
had done what they could within their jurisdiction to no avail.126
Ultimately, because the states were unable to control the ill-
effects of the Louisiana Lottery on their states without the
117 Blakey & Kurland, supra note 1, at 935-36.
118 Devitt, supra note 111, at 346.
119 NAT’L INST. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT & CRIM. JUSTICE, supra note 103, at
512 n.24 (“The ease with which these measures were passed seem [sic] to justify the
repeated claim that the company controlled every Louisiana legislature from 1868 to
1982”); Rose, Third Wave, supra note 102, at 371.
120 Devitt, supra note 111, at 346.
121 Rose, Third Wave, supra note 102, at 372; NAT’L INST. OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT&CRIM. JUSTICE, supra note 103, at 513-14.
122 NAT’L INST.OFLAWENFORCEMENTANDCRIM. JUSTICE, supra note 103, at 514-15.
123 Blakey & Kurland, supra note 1, at 938-39 (citing Act of September 19,
1890, ch. 908, § 2, 26 Stat. 465, codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012)).
124 NAT’L INST.OFLAWENFORCEMENT&CRIM. JUSTICE, supra note 103, at 515-19.
125 Id. at 518 n.39. Opponents were also concerned that the extension of the
prohibition to newspapers threatened the freedom of the press. Id. at 513 n.29.
126 Id. at 518 n.38.
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federal government’s assistance, Congress passed the
legislation.127
The 1890 amendments hurt the business of the
Louisiana Lottery, and in 1892 the Louisiana legislature
prohibited the further sale of lottery tickets.128 It seemed that
the federal role in regulating the lotteries should have been
finished. But the Louisiana Lottery moved its operation to
Honduras, where it was able to reach its U.S. customers
through Florida, without using the postal system and violating
federal law.129 To reach the Louisiana Lottery’s operations,
Congress in 1895 relied on its commerce clause power to pass
18 U.S.C. § 1301. The new law prohibited use of interstate or
foreign commerce to bring lottery-related instruments into the
United States.130 This was a novel and controversial use of the
commerce clause power, which the Supreme Court upheld in
Champion v. Ames in 1903.131
In the second half of the twentieth century, states began
to legalize lotteries.132 The federal laws that helped states keep
the Louisiana Lottery out of their borders were now hindering
the growing number of states that had legalized lotteries.133
The U.S. Department of Justice was ready to prosecute those
states for violation of federal anti-lottery laws, but Congress
passed legislation that exempted state-run lotteries from
federal law.134 This exception was narrowly tailored to exempt
only state-conducted lotteries authorized by state law when they
were acting within their state.135 The exemption excluded those
states that had authorized lotteries, while continuing to enforce
the law with respect to those states that remained anti-lottery.136
127 Id.
128 Rose, Third Wave, supra note 102, at 373. This law did not take effect until
December 31, 1893. See id.
129 Id. at 373-74.
130 See, 18 U.S.C. § 1301 (2012).
131 Rose, Third Wave, supra note 102, at 374 (citing Champion v. Ames, 188
U.S. 321 (1903)).
132 Blakey & Kurland, supra note 1, at 950 (“By 1978, fourteen states had
authorized lotteries.”). The trend continued: in the 1980s seventeen states and the
District of Columbia legalized lotteries, and six more states did so in the 1990s. MASON
&NELSON, supra note 19, at 9.
133 DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OFGAMBLING, supra note 90, at 540.
134 Blakey & Kurland, supra note 1, at 952 (citing Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L.
No. 93-583, 88 Stat. 1916 (1890) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1307 (2012)).
135 For a discussion of the specific exemptions, and the inconsistencies and
problems the exemptions created, see NAT’L INST. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT & CRIM.
JUSTICE, supra note 103, at 545-58.
136 Blakey & Kurland, supra note 1, at 953-54.
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The history of federal regulation of lotteries shows
Congress’s recognition that lotteries are normally an area of
the law left to the states. However, when the states were
unable to enforce their own gambling policies due to action
outside the state, the federal government got involved. In the
case of lotteries, the federal government legislated to protect
the states from the Louisiana Lottery interrupting the integrity
of their anti-lottery stance during a time when the states
generally disfavored lotteries.137 When public opinion had turned
to favoring lotteries in the twentieth century, Congress acted to
exempt state-run lotteries in recognition of that sentiment.
B. Organized Crime and Federal Regulation of Gambling
in the Twentieth Century
The federal government did not involve itself much in
the regulation of gambling in the first half of the twentieth
century.138 Beginning in the 1950s, and lasting into the 1970s,
the federal government began a foray into governing gambling.
Congress legislated during this time because of a growing
concern about organized crime as a nationwide problem.139 It
was concerned with organized crime’s involvement in gambling,
especially because the profits from gambling were the “principal
support of big time racketeering and gangsterism.”140 The federal
government stepped in to govern gambling when they felt there
was a national problem that for various reasons the states alone
could not handle. Twentieth century federal regulation regarding
gambling was largely enacted during three main time periods:
during the Kefauver Committee from 1950-51, under Attorney
General Robert F. Kennedy from 1961-62, and under the Nixon
Administration from 1969-70.141
137 Of course, this was at the expense of states such as Louisiana which
favored lotteries.
138 Blakey & Kurland, supra note 1, at 958.
139 NAT’L INST.OFLAWENFORCEMENT&CRIM. JUSTICE, supra note 103, at 560.
140 ORGANIZED CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT: THE REPORTS, RESEARCH
STUDIES ANDMODEL STATUTES AND COMMENTARIES PREPARED FOR THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME VOL. I, at 13 (Morris Ploscowe, ed.,
Grosby Press 1952) [hereinafter ORGANIZED CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT].
141 Blakey & Kurland, supra note 1, at 959. The efforts under the Nixon
Administration, namely the IGBA, will be discussed infra Part III.
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1. The Kefauver Committee
Before 1950, nationwide efforts to study organized crime
consisted solely of the knowledge gained by the National
Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, a Prohibition-
era look into bootlegging.142 In 1949, President Truman began to
issue public statements that focused national attention on
organized crime, and the FBI was asked to report on crime
nationwide, adding to the attention.143 In February 1950, the
Attorney General’s Conference on Organized Crime further
illuminated the problem of organized crime.144
These events led to the formation of the Special Senate
Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in 1950, the first
extensive national effort to study the problem of organized
crime.145 It became known as the Kefauver Committee, after
Senator Estes Kefauver, who headed the committee.146 The
Kefauver Committee held hearings in 14 cities across the U.S.,
which were widely publicized and even broadcast on
television.147 The Kefauver Committee brought the problem of
organized crime onto the national stage, where it remained for
the next few decades. Although the Kefauver Committee only
immediately resulted in the Johnson Act being passed, its
various proposals and factual findings became the basis for
much of the gambling legislation passed in the coming years.148
The Kefauver Committee found that gambling was the
major source of revenue for organized crime, and that gambling
profits supplied the capital for organized crime’s other
ventures.149 The Committee found that illegal gambling was
142 ORGANIZED CRIME& LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 140, at 10.
143 NAT’L INST. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIM. JUSTICE, supra note 103,
at 563 n.61.
144 Id. at 562.
145 Id.; ORGANIZED CRIME & LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 140, at 1-2, 9-10
(containing the reports authorized by, and the suggestions of, the American Bar
Association’s Commission on Organized Crime, which was created to cooperate with
the federal efforts of the Kefauver Committee).
146 NAT’L INST. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT & CRIM. JUSTICE, supra note 103, at
562 n.60.
147 NAT’L INST. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIM. JUSTICE, supra note 103, at
563 n.61. Those fourteen cities are: Washington D.C., Miami, Tampa, New Orleans,
Kansas City, Cleveland, St. Louis, Detroit, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Las Vegas,
Philadelphia, Chicago, and New York.
148 The Johnson Act prohibits the transportation of gambling devices in
interstate channels. Id. at 564.
149 Id. at 562; ORGANIZED CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 140, at
9-10 (This source summarized the findings of the Kefauver Committee, and since it is a
contemporaneous source connected with the Kefauver Committee which summarized
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mostly controlled by organized crime,150 and that illegal
gambling thrived in many big and small cities, including the 14
cities where the Committee held hearings.151 Given these
findings, it seemed necessary for the federal government to
attack illegal gambling if it wanted to weaken the influence of
organized crime. The Committee was mindful, however, that
anti-gambling laws traditionally fell under state and local
jurisdiction.152 One of the Committee reports recognized as
much when it stated:
While channels of interstate communication and interstate
commerce may be used by organized criminal gangs and syndicates,
their activities are in large measure violations of local criminal
statutes. When criminal gangs and syndicates engage in bookmaking
operations, operate gambling casinos or slot machines, engage in
policy operation, peddle narcotics, operate house[s] of prostitution,
use intimidation or violence to secure monopoly in any area of
commercial activity, commit assaults and murder to eliminate
competition; they are guilty of violating State laws and it is upon
State and local prosecuting agencies, police and courts that the
major responsibility for the detection, apprehension, prosecution and
punishment of offenders rests.153
In the resulting legislation from both the Kefauver
Committee and later legislative efforts that built on it, the
federal government attacked illegal gambling where it had
jurisdiction to do so—where the illegal gambling intersected
with interstate commerce. The federal government had to step
into an area traditionally reserved to the states because only it
had the jurisdiction to do so. Congress also sought to enforce
federal laws in cases where the state and local law enforcement
failed to do so, for various reasons such as apathy, corruption,
and lack of resources.154
The Kefauver Committee found that organized crime
used the channels of interstate commerce to further its
gambling operations.155 For example, modes of interstate
communication such as telephone and wire services were an
integral part of illegal bookmaking (the practice of taking
the Kefauver Committee’s findings from the Committee’s own reports, this source will
be used as the equivalent of the Kefauver Committee’s findings).
150 Paul Bauman & Rufus King, A Critical Analysis of the Gambling Laws, in
ORGANIZED CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 140, at 73.
151 ORGANIZED CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 140, at 11-12.
152 Id. at 22.
153 Id. at 22-23 (quoting page 6 of a Kefauver Committee report).
154 Id. at 15-17.
155 Id. at 14.
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wagers on competitions, usually sporting events such as horse
or dog races, football, and basketball).156 In bookmaking,
interstate communication was often used to place and receive
wagers, as well as obtain information regarding the competitions
being wagered upon.157
State laws were ineffective in curbing illegal
bookmaking because when they prohibited the communication
of bets and wagers, bookmaking operations were able to
conduct their enterprises using out-of-state communication.158
For example, California and Florida only had limited success
when they prohibited the transfer of information used for
illegal bookmaking because the bookmaking operations were
able to get their information from out-of-state sources.159 The
Kefauver Committee introduced two different bills to deal with
this problem, neither of which passed. One, S. 1564, would
have prohibited the transmission through interstate commerce
of information on sporting contests gained through means that
did not have the consent of the owner.160 The other, S. 1624,
would have criminalized the transmission of wagers over
interstate communication.161
The Kefauver Committee recognized that organized
crime also used interstate commerce for the distribution of
gambling devices, most significantly slot machines and
punchboards.162 To this end, in 1951 Congress passed the
Johnson Act,163 which prohibits the transportation of gambling
devices over state lines.164 An objection to this law based on the
fear that it would infringe upon states’ rights, led by one of
Nevada’s Congressmen, was allayed due to a provision which
allowed the states to pass a law exempting themselves from the
Johnson Act.165 This was in keeping with the purpose of the
Johnson Act, “to support the policy of those States which
outlaw slot machines and similar gambling devices, by
156 Id. at 14-15.
157 Id., at 14-15.
158 Id. at 44-45.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 45-46. The bill states that when gambling entities were prohibited from
the race tracks, they found other ways of stealing the information, such as setting up
observation posts overlooking the track and relaying the information from there. See id.
161 Id. at 46-47.
162 ORGANIZED CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 140, at 15.
163 See Johnson Act, ch. 1194, 64 Stat. 1134 (1951) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1171-1178 (2012)).
164 15 U.S.C. § 1172.
165 NAT’L INST. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT & CRIM. JUSTICE, supra note 103, at
565-66; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1172.
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prohibiting the use of the channels of interstate or foreign
commerce for the shipment of such machines or devices into
such States.”166 Like the anti-lottery laws and the Wire Act,
Congress was able to achieve this goal while leaving room for
the states that wished to legalize the prohibited form of
gambling to do so.167
The inability of states to reach gambling enterprises
operating in interstate commerce was not the sole reason the
states could not handle the problem of organized crime’s
involvement in gambling without federal aid. The Kefauver
Committee thought of organized crime as a nationwide
organization, and therefore a uniquely national problem.168 The
large geographical scope of organized crime created problems of
overlapping jurisdiction for local and state law enforcement.169
The Committee found that law enforcement agencies with
overlapping jurisdictions often passed responsibility to one
another in order to evade that responsibility and the lack of
centralized coordination allowed that practice to continue
without accountability.170 This problem was compounded by the
corruption of local and state officials. The Kefauver Committee
found that illegal gambling flourished in certain areas because
the officials in that area were corrupt.171 Law enforcement
officials were often bribed to look the other way.172 The
Committee also found that organized crime leaders had enough
political clout to put their own members into official positions
or get elected officials to work for them.173 The corruption of
local and state governments was a major factor in the federal
government’s intervention.
2. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy
The second period of the federal government’s active
involvement in legislating gambling was in the early 1960s
under Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy. In 1961, Congress
passed the Wire Act, with provisions similar to the bill S. 1624,
which was proposed but not passed during the Kefauver
166 NAT’L INST. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT&CRIM. JUSTICE, supra note 103, at 564
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 81-2769, at 2 (1950)).
167 For a discussion of the Wire Act, see infra Part II.B.2.
168 ORGANIZED CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 140, at 11.
169 Id. at 16.
170 Id. (quoting page 183 of the Committee’s third interim report).
171 Id. at 15.
172 Id. at 16-17.
173 Id. at 17.
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Committee period.174 Like the Kefauver Committee before them,
Robert Kennedy and the Congress that enacted the Wire Act
were concerned with the regulation of gambling because of the
revelation that gambling was a major source of revenue for
organized crime.175 The Wire Act’s purpose was to weaken that
source of illegal revenue by prohibiting the use of a “wire
communication facility for the transmission in interstate or
foreign commerce” of a wager, information pertaining to a
wager, or information that entitles one to receive money as the
result of a wager.176 Also like the Kefauver Committee, Congress
recognized that it was within the states’ power to legalize
gambling, and included an exemption that read:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent . . . the
transmission of information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers
on a sporting event or contest from a State or foreign country where
betting on that sporting event or contest is legal into a State or
foreign country in which such betting is legal.177
This exemption is similar to the exemption made in the
anti-lottery laws in that it retains the states’ power to legalize
the form of gambling prohibited while keeping in place the
federal law that reinforces the laws of those states that have
chosen to prohibit that form of gambling. In this way the law
fulfills its legislative purpose of aiding the states in enforcing
their anti-gambling laws, without interfering with the rights of
other states to legalize gambling.178
With Robert Kennedy’s urging, Congress passed two
more pieces of legislation under the commerce clause power.
The Travel Act prohibits traveling in interstate commerce with
the intent to further unlawful activity.179 Unlawful activity is
further defined to include gambling enterprises, as well as
other activities closely associated with organized crime, such as
bootlegging, narcotics trafficking, bribery, and extortion.180 The
other piece of legislation, 18 U.S.C. § 1953, prohibits the
interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia for the
174 See Wire Act of Sept. 13, 1961, Pub. L. 87-216, 75 Stat. 491 (1961) (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2012)); see also supra Part II.B.1.
175 See Blakey & Kurland, supra note 1, at 966 n.173.
176 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a). This statute is limited to those who are engaged in a
gambling business, and does not apply to those making the bets. Blakey & Kurland,
supra note 1, at 966.
177 18 U.S.C. § 1084(b).
178 NAT’L INST.OFLAWENFORCEMENT&CRIM. JUSTICE, supra note 103, at 570-71.
179 18 U.S.C. § 1952.
180 Id. § 1952(b).
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purposes of bookmaking, wagering pools, or numbers games.181
The statute, in keeping with the Wire Act and other federal
legislation, exempts the transportation of materials into states
where pari-mutuel (typically horse races) or sports betting is
legal.182 In 1975, Congress amended § 1953 to exempt state-run
lotteries, the parallel to the exemption created for the anti-
lottery laws.183
In sum, many of the issues that made state enforcement
of their own gambling laws inadequate continued to be
problematic throughout the 1960s and 1970s. In the nineteenth
century the federal government regulated lotteries because they
had become a national problem and the states were unable to
enforce their anti-lottery laws. Likewise, in the twentieth century
the federal government legislated with regard to gambling
because of the growing national problem of organized crime and
the inability of the states to combat this problem alone. The
history of federal involvement in gambling shows that the federal
government was not interested in defining illegal gambling itself
but rather left that to the states, exempting from federal law that
which was legal under state law. Instead, the purpose of federal
action was to aid the states when larger issues made state
enforcement of state law ineffective.
III. THE LEGISLATIVEHISTORY OF THE ILLEGALGAMBLING
BUSINESS ACT
The IGBA continued on the same path that the federal
government had started on with the Kefauver Commission.
The federal government, concerned with the growing problem
of organized crime, decided to attack its gambling roots.184 It
was necessary to do so because the states were failing to
effectively enforce their own gambling laws.185 The motivation
behind Congressional action was not to usurp state gambling
181 Id. § 1953. Numbers is alternatively known as policy or bolita.
182 Id. § 1953(b). Pari-mutuel betting is a “betting pool in which those who bet on
competitors finishing in the first three places share the total amount bet.” Pari-mutuel
Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
pari-mutuel (last visited Jan. 4, 2014).
183 Blakey & Kurland, supra note 1, at 973. Recall that when states began
legalizing state lotteries, Congress enacted § 1307, exempting those lotteries from the
anti-lottery laws in §§ 1301-1303.
184 See RICHARD NIXON, Special Message to the Congress on a Program to
Combat Organized Crime in America, April 23, 1969, in RICHARD NIXON: 1969:
CONTAINING THE PUBLIC MESSAGES, SPEECHES, AND STATEMENTS OF THE PRESIDENT
315, 320 (1971).
185 116 CONG. REC. 588-91 (1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan).
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regulation, but rather to aid the states in gambling regulation
by addressing their shortcomings. A textual analysis of the
language of the IGBA supports the argument that Congress did
not intend to create a federal substantive definition of
gambling.
In 1967, the President’s Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice issued a report
called “The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society,” which included
a chapter discussing organized crime.186 This influential report
cited gambling as the biggest source of revenue for organized
crime, deriving money from sources “rang[ing] from lotteries, such
as ‘numbers’ or ‘bolita,’ to off-track horse betting, bets on
sporting events, large dice games and illegal casinos.”187 It also
reported that estimates of the annual intake of illegal gambling
ranged from seven to fifty billion dollars, with annual profit as
high as six to seven billion dollars.188 The report said that
organized crime made money from illegal gambling not only by
operating gambling services, but also by receiving payments
from those operations which were independent of organized
crime, often through intimidation.189 President Nixon, in a
message to Congress in 1969, echoed many of these same
findings. He reported the annual gross take of organized crime
from illegal gambling to be estimated at anywhere from 20 to
50 billion dollars.190 He told Congress that illegal gambling, the
“wellspring of organized crime’s financial reservoir,” helped
finance the more reprehensible activities of organized crime,
such as usury, bribery of police and politicians, narcotics
trafficking, and infiltration into legitimate business.191 Because
of this, President Nixon took the position that the effort against
organized crime should focus on illegal gambling.192 In his view,
“[g]ambling income is the life line of organized crime. If we can
cut it or constrict it, we will be striking close to its heart.”193
186 PRES. COMM. ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/42.pdf [hereinafter THECHALLENGEOFCRIME IN AFREESOCIETY].
187 Id. at 188.
188 Id. at 189.
189 Id. at 188.
190 NIXON, supra note 184, at 316.
191 Id. at 320.
192 Id.
193 Id.
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A. The Need for Federal Involvement
Like earlier federal forays into gambling law, the Congress
that passed the IGBA recognized that anti-gambling legislation
was traditionally the purview of the states. However, the
problems organized crime presented called for federal
involvement. Chief among these problems were jurisdictional
problems, lack of resources on the state and local levels, and
the corruption of local and state officials.194 The IGBA sought to
aid the states where they were unable to enforce state
gambling law due to these issues. It was the desire to overcome
these issues, rather than a desire to define gambling under
federal law, that motivated this legislation.
Jurisdictional limitations are one reason that state and
local enforcement of gambling laws were unsuccessful. The
operation of gambling enterprises across various jurisdictional
lines necessitated coordination among more than one law
enforcement agency.195 Unfortunately this cooperation often did
not exist, in part due to lack of trust for fear the other law
enforcement agency was corrupted by organized crime.196 Because
illegal gambling did not operate within state or local borders, the
solution was for Congress to give jurisdiction to the federal
government, which is not bound by these jurisdictional limits.197
This reduced the need for cooperation between possibly corrupt
local and state law enforcement, although the Justice
department still encouraged cooperation between states and
localities.198
The IGBA gives the federal government the power to
prosecute crimes pursuant to § 1955 under its commerce clause
powers.199 Part A of the IGBA contains a Congressional finding
that certain gambling enterprises (those that are operated by
five or more persons, are continuously operated for 30 days or
more or, have a one-day revenue of $2,000 or more) affect
interstate commerce.200 This eliminates the need for the federal
prosecutor to prove any jurisdictional element of the crime
other than that the gambling operation meets the requirements
of Part A.201 Placing jurisdiction in the federal government’s
194 116 CONG. REC. 591 (1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan).
195 THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, supra note 186, at 199.
196 Id.
197 S. REP. No. 91-617, at 73-74 (1969).
198 NIXON, supra note 184, at 317.
199 S. REP. No. 91-617, at 73-74 (1969).
200 116 CONG. REC. 35, 294-95 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff).
201 Id.
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hands eased the problem of investigating and prosecuting
illegal gambling that crossed jurisdictional boundaries.
Another issue that prevented local and state enforcement
agencies from adequately enforcing anti-gambling law was
their lack of resources. Investigating and developing a case for
prosecution often took a significant amount of time and
resources while resulting in a relatively small number of
arrests.202 Experienced state-level prosecutors and investigators
often did not stay in their positions for long, which created a
lack of expertise.203 Simply put, the state and local law
enforcement “lack[ed] . . . sufficient funds to provide adequate
manpower or modern equipment” to enforce anti-gambling
laws.204 Giving the federal government jurisdiction over gambling
cases “ma[de] available to assist local efforts the expertise,
manpower, and resources of the Federal agencies which under
existing Federal anti-gambling statutes have developed high
levels of special competence for dealing with gambling and
corruption cases.”205 President Nixon supported the Justice
Department training investigators, prosecutors, and other
professionals at the state and local levels.206 The resources and
manpower of the FBI, as well as other agencies, was one way
the federal government got involved to help solve local and
state enforcement issues.207
The most troubling state and local enforcement issue
that led to federal involvement was the corruption of state and
local officials. Both President Nixon and members of Congress
felt that illegal gambling could only exist in places where there
was at least some level of corruption of local officials.208 Among
202 THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, supra note 186, at 199.
203 Id.
204 116 CONG. REC. 591 (1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan).
205 116 CONG. REC. 35, 295 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff).
206 NIXON, supra note 184, at 317.
207 116 CONG. REC. 591 (1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan).
208 See, e.g., NIXON, supra note 184, at 321 (“For most large scale illegal
gambling enterprises to continue operations over any extended period of time, the
corruption of corrupt police or local officials is necessary.”); see also Measures Relating
to Organized Crime: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures
of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 394 (1969) (statement of Will Wilson,
Asst. Att’y Gen., Criminal Division, Department of Justice) (“The reason local
government generally is not effective in this area is, more often than not, bribery or
something like it.”); Organized Crime Control: Hearings before Subcomm. No. 5 of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 93 (1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan) (“Title
VIII provides new tools for curbing both the large-scale gambling operations
themselves and the corruption of local officials on which they depend.”); S. REP. No. 91-
617, at 71 (1969) (“The inevitable companion of flourishing gambling activity,
moreover, is the bribery and corruption of local law enforcement officials.”).
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those corrupted by organized crime were law enforcement
officials, prosecutors, politicians, and judges, who “operate[d]
as a ‘silent conspiracy’ in support of organized crime.”209
Organized crime considered “ice money,” money used for
bribery, as a part of its operating expenses.210 Often it was the
local law enforcement officers who took bribes to look the other
way, leaving illegal gambling to operate freely.211 Accepting bribes
was tempting for local law enforcement officers, who were often
underpaid.212 In some places, bribery was not even needed to
corrupt local elected officials, who were elected because it was
known they would be sympathetic to organized crime.213
The corruption of local enforcement officials made local
enforcement of gambling law unsuccessful, and also hindered
federal enforcement. For example, in one case, the IRS
unknowingly cooperated with corrupt local forces, who warned
gamblers of the planned raids on their establishments.214
Organized crime’s corruption of local law enforcement and
officials “destroy[ed] local law enforcement as an effective
weapon against organized crime.”215 The corruption of local
enforcement made state and local efforts to enforce gambling
law ineffective, and necessitated federal involvement to strike
at illegal gambling enterprises and organized crime in general.
In fact, the IGBA includes a provision that makes it illegal to
conspire to obstruct enforcement of state or local law in order to
further an illegal gambling business.216 The combination of
corruption, lack of resources, and lack of jurisdiction convinced
the federal government that in order to strike at the heart of
organized crime, federal action was needed.
B. Congressional Intent
Congress, when deliberating the IGBA, recognized and
respected that gambling was an area of law traditionally
209 116 CONG. REC. 601 (1970) (statement of Sen. Hruska).
210 116 CONG. REC. 604 (1970) (statement of Sen. Allott).
211 Id.
212 The Federal Effort Against Organized Crime: Hearings Before a Subcomm.
of the H. Comm. on Government Operations, 90th Cong. 43-44 (1967) (statement of Mr.
Vinson, Asst. Att’y Gen., Criminal Division, Department of Justice); 116 CONG. REC.
604 (1970) (statement of Sen. Allott).
213 Measures Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Laws and Procedures of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 394 (1969)
(statement of Will Wilson, Asst. Att’y Gen., Criminal Division, Department of Justice).
214 S. REP. No. 91-617 at 71-72 (1969).
215 Id. at 71.
216 18 U.S.C § 1511 (2012).
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reserved to the states. Congress sought to aid the states in the
enforcement of their traditional duties, rather than take over
the regulation of gambling. As the Senate Committee Report
put it,
The enforcement of criminal laws against gambling and other illegal
activities is generally the responsibility of the States and local
governments in our Federal system. While the intent of the
committee is not to preempt this responsibility, it is its intent to
make it possible for the Federal Government to intervene where
local and State governments have become, in effect, incapable of law
enforcement by reason of the corruption of responsible officials. This
limited Federal intervention should serve to reinforce the powers of
the States and local governments in our Federal system, rather than
to inject the Federal Government into a responsibility traditionally
left to the States.217
The legislative history echoes this same sentiment in its
discussion of the intended role of the federal government with
the passage of the IGBA. The new legislation was not intended
to preempt local law enforcement, but to expand the forces
fighting against illegal gambling and organized crime.218
Congress was attempting to encourage local enforcement by
providing “an impetus for effective and honest local
enforcement” and resources to aid it.219 In fact, Congress took
the position that “it is essential that the primary responsibility
for enforcement of the gambling and corruption laws remain in
the hands of state and local officials.”220 The legislative history
shows that Congress was not concerned with making anti-
gambling law a primary responsibility for the federal
government to define and enforce. Instead, the focus was on
helping the states to enforce their existing law when the
challenges presented by organized crime made that difficult for
the states to achieve unaided.
When deliberating the IGBA, Congress was not
preoccupied with defining the meaning of gambling or what
legal standard for the element of chance should be adopted, but
rather with defining gambling in terms of its influence on
interstate commerce. The elements of § 1955(b)(1)(ii) and (iii),
requiring the illegal gambling business be conducted by five or
217 S. REP. No. 91-617, at 74 (1969).
218 Measures Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Laws and Procedures of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 394 (1969)
(statement of Sen. McClellan).
219 116 CONG. REC. 35, 295 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff).
220 Organized Crime Control: Hearings before Subcomm. No. 5 of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 105 (1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan).
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more persons, and be in continuous operation for 30 or more
days or have a gross revenue of $2,000 dollars in a single day,
defined an illegal gambling business in a way that brought
those enterprises under federal jurisdiction pursuant to the
commerce clause.221 The law was designed to target only
gambling enterprises of “major proportions.”222 Debate about
the meaning of gambling, therefore, revolved around the size of
the gambling rather than the games it covered, or the roles of
skill and chance in those games. For example, one congressman
was concerned that the IGBA would reach a friendly game of
poker.223 The response from Representative Poff was that the
law was designed to only reach business-level gambling
enterprises, not casual games.224 The standards set by
§ 1955(b)(1)(ii) and (iii) were meant to focus federal efforts on
the gambling enterprises which were most important, and
therefore of utmost national concern.225 As one Senator
explained,
The approach of this bill is to define an ‘illegal gambling business’ in
terms of the number of people involved and in terms of gross receipts
and length of operation . . . . This is a sound and necessary
approach . . . . [It] focuses the attack on the large-scale gambling
enterprises which are the bread and butter of organized crime.226
Congress sought only to reach the illegal gambling that
was influential enough to be brought under its commerce
221 18 U.S.C. § 1955.
222 S. REP. No. 91-617, at 73 (1969). The Report goes on to state that
It is anticipated that cases in which this standard [referring to
§ 1955(b)(1)(iii)] can be met will ordinarily involve business-type gambling
operations of considerably greater magnitude that this definition would
indicate, however, because it is usually possible to prove only a relatively
small proportion of the total operations of a gambling enterprise. Thus, the
legislation would in practice not apply to gambling that is sporadic or of
insignificant monetary proportions. It will reach only those who prey
systematically upon our citizens and whose syndicated operations are so
continuous and so substantial as to be a matter of national concern.
223 116 CONG. REC. 35, 205 (1970) (statement of Rep. Mivka).
224 Id. (statement of Rep. Poff). It is significant that Representative Poff
responded to the concern of whether this statute would criminalize a social game of
poker with a statement about the size and character of the gambling operation, not
whether poker would be considered gambling under a federal definition of gambling. It
emphasizes that Congress intended to define an illegal gambling business, not
gambling itself.
225 Measures Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Laws and Procedures of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 394 (1969)
(statement of Sen. McClellan, Chairman, Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and
Procedures).
226 116 CONG. REC. 602-03 (1970) (statement of Sen. Yarborough).
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clause jurisdiction, and significant enough to deal a blow to
organized crime when prosecuted.
C. The Meaning of § 1955(b)(2)
Congress’s discussion of defining gambling in terms of
the number of people involved, gross intake, and longevity
stands in stark contrast to what Congress did not discuss—a
federal substantive definition of gambling. In the legislative
history there is no discussion of what § 1955(b)(2) means.
Recall that § 1955(b)(2) states “‘gambling’ includes but is not
limited to pool-selling, bookmaking, maintaining slot machines,
roulette wheels or dice tables, and conducting lotteries, policy,
bolita or numbers games, or selling chances therein.”227 In the
legislative record, explanations of the crime repeatedly name
the three elements found in § 1955(b)(1), without any mention
of § 1955(b)(2).228 In the House, the crime was summarized as
“mak[ing] large-scale gambling operations in violation of State
law a federal offense,” without mention of § 1955(b)(2) adding a
federal definitional element to gambling.229 Even when
§ 1955(b)(2) was mentioned when summarizing the elements of
the crime, Congress did not discuss the section as adding a
separate element to the crime.230 Given the variety of the
common law definitions of gambling, and the different ways
Congress could chose to define gambling, it seems unlikely that
Congress would adopt one of these definitions with no
discussion.231 Keeping in mind that throughout the history of
gambling, federal involvement in the regulation of gambling
deferred to the states for defining what constituted illegal
gambling, it makes sense that Congress intended for gambling
to be defined entirely by state law.
Of course it is ultimately the text of the statute rather
than the intention of the enacting legislative body that governs.
While § 1955(b)(2) may purport to define gambling, what it
says is “‘gambling’ includes but is not limited to” a list of games
227 18 U.S.C. § 1955(b)(2) (2012).
228 See Measures Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 394
(1969) (statement of Sen. McClellan, Chairman, Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and
Procedures); 116 CONG. REC. 601 (1970) (statement of Sen. Hruska); 116 CONG. REC.
35, 196 (1970) (statement of Rep. Celler).
229 116 CONG. REC. 35, 327 (1970) (statement of Rep. Randall). Nearly identical
language appears at 116 CONG. REC. 35, 197 (1970) (statement of Rep. McCulloch).
230 S. REP. No. 91-617 at 73, 156 (1969).
231 See supra Part I.
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prohibited as gambling.232 This language indicates Congress’s
intention to create an illustrative, non-exhaustive list.233 The
court in United States v. Dicristina examined this list of games
and concluded that, because in all of the games listed chance
predominates over skill, § 1955(b)(2) adopts a federal
predominance test.234 But all of these games could also fulfill the
material element test, and some of them could fulfill the pure
chance test.235 While the list is illustrative, a categorization of
the listed possibilities should not serve as a stand-in for a
federal definition of gambling when it is not clear such a
definition was intended. A categorization of the listed
possibilities should not be made to define the characteristics of
all the possibilities, morphing their similarities of the listed
games into a substantive definition of gambling, when they
could stand for more than one possible definition. Further, the
canon of ejusdem generis—“where general words follow a
specific enumeration of persons or things, the general words
should be limited to persons or things similar to those
specifically enumerated”—only applies when the statutory
meaning is ambiguous, which it is not.236
A comparison of the language in § 1955(b)(2) with the
list contained in § 1955(e) further supports the argument that
§ 1955(b)(2) does not adopt a federal substantive definition of
gambling. Section 1955(e) states, “[t]his section shall not apply
to any bingo game, lottery, or similar game of chance.”237 It is a
canon of construction that “[w]here Congress includes particular
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another
section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress
acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or
exclusion.”238 In § 1955(e), Congress chose to finish a non-
exhaustive list with a term that describes and categorizes other
232 18 U.S.C. § 1955(b)(2) (2012).
233 United States v. Dicristina, 726 F.3d 92, 99-100 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal
citations omitted).
234 United States v. Dicristina, 886 F. Supp. 2d 164, 229-30 (E.D.N.Y. 2012),
rev’d 726 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2013).
235 Under the material element test, all of the listed games have chance as a
material element in determining the outcome. There are also arguments that
bookmaking (as well as beating a bookie) requires skill, which would fulfill the pure
chance doctrine. See Christopher T. Pickens, Of Bookies and Brokers: Are Sports
Futures Gambling or Investing, and Does It Even Matter?, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV., 227,
250 (2006); Dicristina, 886 F. Supp. 2d at 229 (citing arguments that bookmaking and
pool-selling requires substantial skill).
236 Dicristina, 726 F.3d 92 at n.8 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
237 18 U.S.C. § 1955(e) (2012).
238 Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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games that would belong in that list, games that are “similar
games of chance.”239 Conversely, § 1955(b)(2) gives an illustrative
list but does not categorize the types of games prohibited.
If Congress were adopting a federal definition of
gambling in § 1955(b)(2), it would be strange to do so without
articulating that definition, especially given the pivotal role
that the chance—skill dichotomy plays in determining the
legality of a game. The fact that Congress did comment on the
role of chance in § 1955(e), but failed to do so in § 1955(b)(2),
serves to make that omission in § 1955(b)(2) even more suspect.
Clearly Congress was aware that it could typify the games it
sought to prohibit by commenting on the role chance played in
those games; however, it did not. Additionally, § 1955(e) does
not refer to or claim to modify § 1955(b)(2) in any way.240
The textual differences between the IGBA and its
proposed predecessor, S. 2022, further illustrate the point that
the text of § 1955(b)(2) does not create a substantive definition
of gambling. That bill read “[a]s used in this section, the term
‘illegal gambling business’ means betting, lottery, or numbers
activity.”241 Representative McCulloch, who introduced the bill,
said that the proposed legislation would “give the Federal
Government the necessary weapons to attack all of these
activities [casino-type gambling, sports bookmaking, off-track
betting, bolita, policy, numbers, large dice games] with the
exception of illegal casino-type gambling.”242 The bill defines a
gambling business as these three types of gambling—betting,
lottery, and numbers—and it was interpreted that way by
Representative McCulloch.243 The change of language from S. 2022,
defining gambling as meaning those three types of games, to
§ 1955(b)(2) defining gambling as “includes but is not limited to,” is
significant. It changes the language from one defining gambling, to
a non-exhaustive list that lists some, but not all, of the games that
are considered gambling.
The legislative history of the IGBA shows that the main
reason for federal interference in the matter of governing
239 18 U.S.C. § 1955(e).
240 Dicristina, 726 F.3d 92 at 100.
241 115 CONG. REC. 10, 736 (1969) (S. 2022 read into record). S. 2022 is similar
in structure to § 1955. The quoted portion is contained in the equivalent of what is
§ 1955(b)(1), followed by the equivalent of what became § 1955(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii). S.
2022 contains no provision parallel to § 1955(b)(2), rather § 1955(b)(2) and § 1955(b)(1)
were condensed into proposed § 1953A(b) (the quoted language).
242 115 CONG. REC. 10, 785 (1969) (statement of Rep. McCulloch).
243 Id. It should be noted that lottery and numbers includes policy and bolita,
and that betting includes bookmaking and off-track betting.
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gambling was due to the inability of states and localities to
adequately enforce their gambling law. This fits with the
history of federal regulation of gambling, when the federal
government acted when the states were unable to enforce their
anti-lottery policies when challenged by the Louisiana Lottery
and when organized crime made corruption, lack of resources,
and lack of jurisdiction major factors in the inability of states to
enforce gambling law. Congress also recognized the variance in
state law regarding the legality of gambling, and did not seek
to impose its own federal agenda in place of that variation.
Rather, throughout the history of the regulation of gambling,
Congress has sought to aid the states when they were incapable
of enforcing their own gambling law. With the IGBA, Congress
recognized and continued this tradition. Congress did not intend
to take over deciding which forms of gaming were prohibited as
illegal gambling, but rather to aid the states in enforcing their
own definitions of what constituted illegal gambling.
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